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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-THE PATH
LEADS TO NOWHERE: THE SUPREME COURT RE-EXAMINES THE TREK
THROUGH THE POLITICAL THICKET. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
Even a passing glance at the history of voting rights in the United
States presents a picture of a voting system wracked by systematic and
chronic vote denial and vote dilution. Complex and convoluted registration
rules undermine the voting rights of numerous groups-in practice if not by
intention. Out-of-date voting technologies and local control over the elec-
tion process produce widely disparate election results-empowering some
voters while effectively disenfranchising many others. Even the way we
organize our elections-employing at-large or mandatory majority vote
procedures-repeatedly dilutes the impact of certain groups' ballots, in the
process undermining the significance of the act of voting.'
The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to enter into po-
litical questions. 2 In 1946, the Court refused to intervene on behalf of Ken-
neth Colegrove, a faculty member at Northwest University in Illinois who
claimed that he was being discriminated against because his vote in the
Seventh District was worth one-eighth that of individuals in the Fifth Dis-
trict.3 Justice Frankfurter wrote in the Colegrove v. Green4 opinion that the
Court would not enter into such a "political thicket.",5 Yet, in 1962, the
Court did just that in Baker v. Carr6 when it decided that the lower courts
should apply the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection requirement to
determine whether districting plans were constitutionally sound.7 From this
beginning, the Court continued to expand judicial intervention in political
8districting cases.
1. CHARLES L. ZELDEN, VOTING RIGHTS ON TRIAL, at xi (2002).
2. See Id. at 124.
3. GENE GRAHAM, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: BAKER v. CARR AND THE AMERICAN
LEVELLERS 23-24 (1972).
4. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
5. Id. at 556.
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 27 (1963). The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See infra Part III.
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This article will examine the Court's initial refusal to get involved in
the Colegrove case. 9 It will then examine Baker v. Carr and trace the cases
that pushed the doors wide open for the Court to begin hearing cases involv-
ing states' redistricting plans up to Davis v. Bandemer.'0 Then, the path
leads to Vieth v. Jubelirer,"1 a case that attempted to stop the confusion that
resulted from the Bandemer decision.1 2 Finally, this article will discuss
whether Vieth actually managed to clear the air, and by what standards state
districting plans can now be judged. 13 When the journey is through, this
article discusses the potential for political gerrymandering claims to arise
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and what alternatives exist to protect one
of this nation's most fundamental institutions-the electoral process. 14
II. FACTS
A. Redistricting
The original plaintiffs in Vieth v. Jubelirer, Richard Vieth, Norma Jean
Vieth, and Susan Furey, were registered Pennsylvania Democrats. 15 The
defendants included the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and those respon-
sible for Act One, Pennsylvania's new redistricting plan.' 6 According to the
plaintiffs, the 2000 census resulted in Pennsylvania having two less con-
gressional representatives than previous years, for a total of nineteen repre-
sentatives. 17 With the new population figures in hand, Pennsylvania's Gen-
eral Assembly began the process of redistricting.' 8 Even with a Republican
majority in both state houses and a Republican governor, 19 the two houses
could not agree on a redistricting plan in 2001.20
Meanwhile, Republican Party leaders on a national level started en-
couraging a redistricting plan that would allegedly serve as a retaliatory
measure for redistricting plans in other parts of the country that favored the
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). See infra Parts III.B. and III.C.
11. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Id.
15. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-72 (2004) (" Vieth IV').




20. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (M.D. Pa. 2002) ("Vieth 1"). Ac-
cording to Vieth I, among the nationally recognized political personalities implicated in the
redistricting plan were United States Senator Rick Santorum, Speaker of the House Dennis
Hastert, and political consultant Karl Rove. Id.
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Democratic Party.2 1 In January 2002, after a Conference Committee vote
that fell down party lines, Pennsylvania's legislature passed the redistricting
bill that became Act One upon the governor's signature.22
Act One divided Pennsylvania's 12,281,054 residents among the
State's allotted nineteen districts.23 Although an even distribution of those
residents would have meant districts of 646,371 or 646,372 individuals, Act
One left the largest district with 646,380 and the smallest district with
646,361.24 In addition, Act One used its congressional districts to slice up
local governments.25 The ultimate effect of all this slicing and dicing was
the potential for the Republican Party to walk away from the upcoming
congressional elections with thirteen of the nineteen available seats notwith-
standing a general population that was approximately half Republican and
half Democrat.2 6
The plaintiffs wanted to prevent the redistricting of Pennsylvania ac-
cording to Act One's design.27 The complaint included a claim for in-
fringement on the constitutional requirement to equally proportioned dis-
tricts as mandated by Article I, Section Two of the United States Constitu-
tion.28 Plaintiffs also claimed a Fourteenth Amendment violation because
the new plan, with its oddly shaped districts and lack of regard for political
boundaries, was an attempted political gerrymander.29
B. Procedural History
Initially, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania based on sovereign immunity according to
the Eleventh Amendment.30 The district court also dismissed the political
gerrymandering claim because the plaintiffs failed to show that the redis-
tricting plan actually discriminated against them.31 On the other hand, the
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint that the plan violated the
Article I, Section 2 requirement of equally populated districts.
32
21. Id.
22. Id. Every Democrat on the Conference Committee opposed the redistricting plan,
while every Republican member supported the plan. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The 1992 redistricting plan resulted in the division of twenty-seven local gov-
ernments. Id. at 535-536. By comparison, Act One resulted in the division of eighty-four
local governments. Id. at 535.
26. Vieth I, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
27. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 272.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. ViethI, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
31. Id. at 547.
32. Id. at 543.
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At trial, the district court found that, in light of the very real possibility
that districts could be created with equal populations, the defendants failed
to provide a valid justification for its unequal population distribution among
districts.33 Instead of presenting a remedy, however, the court directed the
state legislature to draft a new plan that would meet constitutional require-
ments, with the district court retaining jurisdiction until the new plan could
be created.34
As a result of this order, Pennsylvania's General Assembly created an-
other plan for congressional districting.35 Upon the governor's signature, the
plan became Act Thirty-Four.36 Under this new plan, the difference between
the district with the highest population and lowest population would have
been ninety-seven. 37 The plaintiffs wanted the district court to compel re-
medial districts.38 Unlike their argument at trial, this time the plaintiffs
failed to show a lack of good faith by the defendants in creating the dis-
tricts. 39 The court believed that the Pennsylvania legislature attempted to
create equally sized districts when it enacted Act Thirty-Four. 40 Therefore,
the Act was not in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution.4 1 Not only did the district court hold that Act Thirty-Four cured
any problems present in Act One, but also that the revised redistricting plan
did not constitute a political gerrymander.42 From this decigion, the plain-
tiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.43
III. BACKGROUND
In the year 1812, a strange creature appeared on the political map of
Massachusetts. 44 State Democrats conjured up this creature to aid in secur-
ing elections.45 The creature was a political district drawn by the legislature
33. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (M.D. Pa. 2002) ("Vieth IF).
34. Id. at 678-79.
35. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 480 (M.D. Pa. 2003) ("Vieth I1").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 481.
38. Id. at 480.
39. Id. at 483.
40. Id.
41. Veith II, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
42. Id. at 485.
43. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 273.
44. AM. BAR Assoc. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTION LAW AND VOTER
PARTICIPATION, Div. OF PUB. SERV. ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: A PUBLIC




with the encouragement of the governor, Elbridge Gerry.4 6 Compared to a
salamander, the creature was dubbed the "gerrymander. ' 47 Gerrymander-
ing,48 once referred to as "the art of political cartography," is essentially a
method of drawing the political map so that one party is benefited while the
other party is harmed.49 Since then, courts continued to struggle with the
influence of the gerrymander on American politics, especially as it relates to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. °
Part of the reason that there has been a struggle may lie in the fact that,
to some extent, political gerrymandering (not including racial gerrymander-
ing) is tolerable and even expected. 51 In the final analysis, the United States
Supreme Court allows politically motivated redistricting under several con-
ditions.52 Legislatures can use their districting power to create districts that
favor their own parties.53 The Constitution does not require that there be any
proportional relationship between the size of the political party in the gen-
eral population and its representation in the legislature. 4 Legislatures are
allowed to create districts that keep existing candidates in office. 55 Finally,
the Supreme Court has not foreclosed on individual politicians creating dis-
tricts that protect their own interests and ambitions.56
Two very common methods used by politicians to create favorable dis-
tricts are breaking up groups of minority voters into multiple districts and
placing groups of minority voters into small numbers of districts. 57 The first
method dilutes votes because it takes a group that might normally vote in a
unified manner, divides it into smaller pieces, and places those pieces into
different districts so that those voters' voices are drowned out by the major-
ity of voters in the new districts. 8 This type of gerrymandering is known as
"cracking." 59 The second approach dilutes votes because, by lumping to-
gether all (or as many as possible) of the minority voters into a few districts,
it prevents that group from affecting elections in other districts and "wastes"
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gerrymandering is "[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral
districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by
diluting the opposition's voting strength." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (8th ed. 2004).
49. HACKER, supra note 7, at 46-47.
50. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 276-77.
51. See J. GERALD HEBERT ET. AL., THE REALISTS' GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING






57. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections §§ 56, 57 (2004).
58. Id. at § 56.
59. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 286, n.7.
2006]
UALR LAW REVIEW
that group's voting unity in the saturated districts.60 This type of gerryman-
dering is known as "packing.",
6
'
This section will start by examining the United States Supreme Court's
initial hesitation to become entangled in individual states' districting dis-
putes. 62 It will then show how the Court finally became involved in district-
ing disputes via the constitutional requirement of equally populated dis-
tricts.63 From there, the Court found itself sorting out "packing" and "crack-
ing" on a racial level, thus forcing the courts to decide the propriety of racial
gerrymandering. 64 From there, it was only a small step for the Court to be-
come completely ensnared in questions of political gerrymandering.65
A. Court Involvement in Political Districting
Initially, courts were reluctant to get involved in districting disputes.66
The Supreme Court demonstrated its reluctance in the 1946 opinion of
Colegrove v. Green.67 The plaintiffs in that case pointed to the failure of the
Illinois districts to meet the requirements of compactness and generally
equal population distribution.68 In response, Justice Frankfurter pointed out
that the plaintiff had not suffered a wrong, but rather the complaint con-
cered aof the Illinois population. 69 Justice Frankfurtercmda particular segmentofteIlnipouao.JsicFrkutr
also noted that court involvement in politics on this level was "hostile" to
this nation's political system. 70 The Constitution's make-or-alter provision,
Article I, Section Four, charged Congress with checking political districts.
71
60. 25 AM. JuR. 2D Elections § 57 (2004). In Vieth IV, Justice Scalia notes that packing
can occur naturally based on the fact that sound groups (in this case, political groups) are
inclined to "cluster," so district lines drawn around these groups would make them appear
somewhat packed. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 289-90.
61. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 286 n.7. Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan identified a
third form of political gerrymandering known as "shacking." Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, The Law of Democracy: The Texas and Pennsylvania Partisan Gerrymandering
Cases: Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 541, 552 (2004). In this type of gerrymandering, mapmakers examine voter demo-
graphics as well as where the representatives live (the representative's "shack"). Id. Districts
can be redrawn so that the incumbent representative can either be cut out of the district, or
two incumbents (previously from different districts) can be drawn into one district, forcing
them to square-off in the upcoming election. Id.
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part III.B.
64. See Part III.C.1.
65. See infra Part III.C.2.
66. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 550-51.
69. Id. at 552.
70. Id. at 553-54.
71. Id. at 554.
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In order to avoid stepping on Congress's toes, the Supreme Court resolved
the dilemma by leaving the remedy with the very same groups that created
the districts in the first place-state legislatures-then by abdicating the issue
to Congress. 72 By keeping districting disputes confined within the legisla-
tive branch, the Court avoided entering what Justice Frankfurter referred to
as the "political thicket. 73
B. The Court Draws the Line (Right Through the Political Thicket)
Less than twenty years later, the inequality of district sizes was becom-
ing hard to ignore. 74 Tennessee served as an example of how unequal popu-
lation growth could result in Equal Protection Clause claims.75 Populations
redistributed as people from the countryside moved into the cities.76 The
state's districting plan, however, did not reflect these changes. 77 For exam-
ple, one Tennessee congressman represented three times as many constitu-
ents as certain other rural congressmen. 78 Not surprisingly, this discrepancy
was readily apparent in the distribution of tax money, with farms receiving
subsidies and exemptions while cities searched for a way to get more.79 In
order to address this inequality, the United States Supreme Court would
have to deal head-on with Colegrove.
80
72. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
73. Id. In cautioning the Court about becoming involved in political disputes such as
redistricting cases, Justice Frankfurter stated,
Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in dis-
tricting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke
the ample powers of Congress. The Constitution has many commands that are
not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall outside the conditions and
purposes that circumscribe judicial action.
Id.
74. See GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 12-18.
75. Id. at 11-12.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 15-16. Tennessee was not the only state facing this type of predicament. See
id. at 13. Problems with representation in Chicago prompted that city to warn Illinois of its
desire to secede over the situation if it were not improved. Id.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 18.
80. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 202 (1962). Joseph Carr and Charlie Baker of
Baker v. Carr did not meet until late 1965, three years after the case was decided. GRAHAM,
supra note 3, at 11. Carr, the Secretary of State in Tennessee, showed up at Baker's Memphis
office to introduce himself, saying, "I figured it was about time we met since everybody
keeps using our names together." Id. Carr was named as a defendant in the case because of
his political position. Id. at 19.
2006]
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1. Baker v. Carr Gets the Court Moving
In Baker v. Carr, jurisdiction arose through Article III, Section Two of
the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)81 and the plaintiffs had standing
because the issue was personal, affecting the individual's right to vote.
82
Although the nonjusticiability of political questions shut down the claim in
Colegrove, the Court now held that the apportionment in this case was not a
political question.83 The Court then gave a list of factors to aid in determin-
ing whether an issue before the Court was a political question. 84 Those fac-
tors were:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
85
The only reason that a court would need to dismiss a claim for present-
ing a political question would be if one of these factors presented appeared
inseparable from the issue facing the court.86 Cases would have to be exam-
ined on an individual basis to determine the presence of a political ques-
tion.87 In addition, any claim under the Guaranty Clause would still be non-
justiciable.88 By showing the requisite discrimination, plaintiffs could jump
out of the political question ring and potentially land safely under the pro-
tection of the Equal Protection Clause.89
The Boston Globe noted that Baker v. Carr started courts on a course
that would "change Congress." 90 Though this was a milestone in the pro-
gression of voting rights,9' the ultimate result was anti-climactic---on re-
81. Baker, 369 U.S. at 200.
82. Id. at 204, 208.
83. Id. at 209.
84. Id. at217.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 217.
87. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
88. Id. at 218.
89. Id. at 209-10.
90. Nelson W. Polsby, Election 2000: What Does it All Mean? No Reason to Fix a
System That Works, BosToN GLOBE, November 9, 2000, at A19.
91. GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 12.
[Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
mand the lower court expressed a desire to maintain a low level of court
involvement and sent the districting plan back to the legislature to correct its
shortcomings.92 Still, after 150 years of shutting out political questions, the
door had finally been cracked open.93 The momentum carried the Court (and
the lawsuits) forward, and in 1963 the Supreme Court examined Gray v.
Sanders.
94
2. Cases Continue to Ride on the Back of Baker v. Carr
Gray addressed the districting system in Georgia where one to three
representatives were given to each county based on the county's popula-
tion.95 In a statewide primary election, a candidate receiving the highest
number of votes in a county was entitled to two votes for each representa-
tive to which that county was entitled. 96 Through this system, one of Geor-
gia's counties that had 14.11% of the state's population only had 1.46% of
the unit votes which determined the winner in a statewide primary.97 Broken
down by residents, one county had one unit vote for 938 residents, while
another had one unit vote for 92,721 residents. 98 While the Court had juris-
diction and standing based on Baker, it did not use the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a starting point.99 Instead, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments held the key.100 Because Georgia's system weighted some votes more
than others, it effectively discriminated against anyone whose vote was
weighted less. °10 Then the Court called in the Fourteenth Amendment, not-
ing that all votes should be weighted equally. 10 2 Based on these considera-
tions, it appeared that the Constitution could require nothing less than "one
person, one vote."'
10 3
The next year, the Court marched ahead with the cadence, "one person,
one vote," still ringing in its ears when it decided Wesberry v. Sanders.' 4
This case was the final strike on Colegrove v. Green.'°5 Plaintiffs in Wes-
berry complained that the district apportionment in Georgia resulted in
92. See Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp 341, 348, 350 (1962).
93. ZELDEN, supra note 1, at 124.
94. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).




99. Id. at 373, 376.
100. Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 381.
104. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
105. GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 267.
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some of their congressmen representing only half of the constituents that
other congressmen represented. 10 6 This, in turn, violated their Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 0 7 The district court relied on Colegrove to dismiss the
claim.108
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, drew a connection between
Wesberry and Baker and held that the case was justiciable.'0 9 This afforded
the opportunity to examine the case on its merits. 10 Allowing some votes to
carry more weight than others seemed to run counter to this country's de-
mocratic process and the ideas behind the Constitution."' After examining
Article I, Section Two of the Constitution, the Court determined that elec-
tions for the House of Representatives had to be on a population basis. 12 In
fact, debates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention touched on that very
topic as delegates pushed for proportional representation so that each repre-
sentative would answer to an equal number of citizens." 13 Based on the na-
tion's history and what the Court believed were constitutional requirements,
the holding in the Wesberry case required that the House of Representatives
maintain "equal representation for equal numbers of people." 14 This hold-
ing acknowledged the difficulty of creating districts with exactly equal
population distribution, but required that those creating the political maps
make such districts with that ultimate goal in mind.' '
In 1964 the Supreme Court handed down Reynolds v. Sims." 6 Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs in that case, the Alabama Constitution required the leg-
islature to reapportion every ten years, but the legislature had not been
meeting that requirement. 17 Plaintiffs claimed that the last apportionment
was done as a result of a federal census from 1900.118 Meanwhile, Ala-
bama's population had increased more in some areas than in others. 119 The
ultimate result of this, according to the plaintiffs, was that their voting rights
were being violated, and they had received no assistance from the courts in
106. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Wesberry, 376 U. S. at 8-9.
113. Id. at 10-11.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id.
116. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
117. Id. at 540-41.




correcting the problem. 120 Once again, Baker provided the grounds for ju-
risdiction.'
21
The Reynolds Court harkened back to Baker and Wesberry, noting the
importance that those cases placed on population distribution and the weight
of individual citizens' votes. 22 No other right could be enjoyed to its fullest
where the right to vote had been diminished. 123 In applying the "one person,
one vote" standard, the Reynolds Court held that, to pass muster under the
Equal Protection Clause, states must establish "substantially equal . . . legis-
lative representation."' 124 In addition, when a state legislature has two
houses, both must be apportioned by population. 1
25
The requirement of "substantially equal" apportionment did not mean
absolutely perfect population distribution. 126 Instead, based on Wesberry,
the requirement would be "as nearly as practicable."' 127 This standard pro-
vided some flexibility to states in creating districts for their legislatures.
28
Where the distribution deviates somewhat from the equal-apportionment
requirement, the deviation must be due to some genuine state interest.
129
These interests include consideration for political boundaries, compactness,
and contiguity.
130
These are not the only traditional interests that states use in creating
districts.' 3' The American Bar Association's publication The Realists'
Guide to Redistricting lists five customary interests (as well as mentioning
interests that may vary among the states). 132 In addition to those enumerated
in Reynolds, the ABA also includes, "respect for communities of interest"
and "protection of incumbents."' 133 So far, there has been no exact definition
for what constitutes compactness. 34 The test seems to run from scientific
assessment (such as measuring "dispersion") to simply looking at the dis-
trict shape and using a common sense approach. 135 Contiguity seems to be a
minor factor for consideration. 136 While those creating political maps can
120. Id
121. Id. at 542.
122. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-59.
123. Id. at 560.
124. Id. at 568.
125. Id.
126. Id at 577.
127. Id.
128. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. HEBERT, supra note 51, at 59.
132. Id. at 59-65.
133. Id. at 59.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 60.
136. Id. at 61.
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use community interests in drawing borders, districts cannot be created
strictly on the basis of race.
1 37
C. The Gerrymander Rears Its Ugly Head
Though the Supreme Court was able to dispose of unequally populated
districts through the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, that evasive
creature-the political gerrymander-proved tougher to wrangle. 38 Gerry-
mandering itself was an old game in American politics, though it was not
known as such until 1812.139 It is possible that gerrymandering dates back to
the early 1700s in the United States. 40 Even Patrick Henry may have used
the gerrymander in an effort to prevent James Madison from participating in
the First Congress. 14 In fact, not only did the gerrymander have a long his-
tory in this country prior to Baker and its offspring, but it had even been
scrutinized by the Supreme Court the year before Baker was decided.1
42
1. The Racial Gerrymander
There is no denying that in the late 1950s through the 1960s the United
States faced strong forces that acted to shape American culture. 143 It was
1955 when Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of the bus in compliance
with Jim Crow laws, igniting the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama.'
44
It was September of 1957 when Central High School in Little Rock, Arkan-
sas, was to admit black students as a part of desegregation. 145 Those stu-
dents entered the school with the sound of "two, four, six, eight, we ain't
going to integrate," ringing in their ears. 46 It was 1960 when a small group
of black students in North Carolina sat down at a Woolworth's to have
lunch and refused service. 147 Over the next several days, hundreds more had
joined those students, beginning what became known as the "sit-in move-
ment.' 48 The year 1961 brought the Freedom Rides. 149 The summer of
137. HEBERT, supra note 51, at 63.
138. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 280-81.
139. Id. at 274.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
143. See WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II
(Oxford University Press 3d ed. 1995).
144. Id. at 161-62.
145. Id. at 158.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 165.
148. Id.
149. CHAFE, supra note 143, at 208.
[Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1963 brought a crowd of 250,000 to the Lincoln Memorial to hear the
speech, "I Have a Dream," given by Dr. Martin Luther King. 5 0 Then, 1965
brought race riots to Los Angeles as well as the assassination of Malcolm
x.
15 1
This was the climate in which the racial gerrymander slithered its way
to the steps of the Supreme Court.' 52 In the 1957 case, Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, Alabama's legislature took a once-square Tuskegee city boundary
and reshaped it into a twenty-eight-sided Tuskegee city boundary. 53 The
new shape cut out almost all 400 black voters without cutting out any white
voters from the city, meaning the ousted black voters could not participate
in the municipal elections. 54 The black residents, believing they had a de-
cent discrimination claim, sued for violations of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. 55 The Supreme Court, while still tipping its hat to
individual states' authority to create and shape political districts, noted that
the Constitution does, in fact, place a limit on that districting power. 56 But
it was the Fifteenth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, that the Court invoked
to limit states' power.157 States simply were not free to slap a coat of paint
on racial discrimination and call it "politics" without violating the Fifteenth
Amendment.1
58
Baker had not been decided yet, but because the Court side-stepped the
Fourteenth Amendment and resolved Gomillion v. Lightfoot using the Fif-
teenth Amendment, the Court's refusal to adjudicate these types of district-
ing claims in Colegrove did not present an obstacle.' 59 Where Colegrove
presented a question of district apportionment, Gomillion presented a ques-
tion of racial discrimination in voting rights-a Fifteenth Amendment is-
sue. 160 This decision made racial gerrymandering unconstitutional, yet, be-
150. Id. at312.
151. Id. at318.
152. "By May of 1963, the Justice Department had become involved in voting rights
issues in 145 Southern counties-nearly a 500 percent increase over the thirty counties sub-
ject to federal intervention in 1960." See id at 208.
153. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
154. Id. at 341.
155. Id. at 340.
156. Id. at 342, 344.
157. Id. at 345.
158. Id.
159. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345-46.
160. Id. at 346. Shaw v. Reno addressed the converse situation of Gomillion-
gerrymandering in order to benefit racial minorities. See 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993). This type
of gerrymandering has been referred to as "affirmative racial gerrymandering." Melissa L.
Saunders, Redistricting in a New America: of Minority Representation, Multiple-Race Re-
sponses, and Melting Pots: Redistricting in the New America, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1367, 1367
(2001). In Shaw, the court examined a districting plan in North Carolina that created districts
that had been described as a "Rorschach ink-blot test" by the lower court and a "bug splat-
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cause it was not decided under the Equal Protection Clause, it proved to be
little help in resolving questions surrounding political gerrymandering.
161
2. The Political Gerrymander
In 1985 Davis v. Bandemer presented an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to deal squarely with two important questions: 1) Are political gerry-
mandering claims justiciable? 2) If so, what are the standards for determin-
ing whether there has been a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?,
62
The claim was brought by a group of Democrats from Indiana who claimed
that the state's legislature "unconstitutionally diluted" their votes through a
1981 redistricting plan. 63 Because the plan created oddly shaped districts
that had little relation to political boundaries and tended to favor Republi-
cans, the district court decided that the plan was indeed unconstitutional.
164
In deciding justiciability of a political gerrymandering claim, the Court
jumped back to Baker and retraced its steps through claims of unequally
populated districts, to racial gerrymandering, to cases that hinted at the jus-
ticiability of political gerrymandering questions. 65 Though the Court had
upheld district court decisions that political gerrymandering was not justici-
able, it was entitled to answer the question for itself once and for all. 166 In
order to do so, the Baker political question analysis had to be addressed.
67
The analysis for equally populated districts as a political question used in
Baker was the same for political gerrymandering cases. 168 One factor in
tered on a windshield" by the Wall Street Journal. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635. A section of one
district ran along 1-85, becoming so narrow in some places that a state legislator commented
that "[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the
people in the district." Id. at 636. Because the North Carolina redistricting plan was "so
irrational on its face that it [could] be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate voting districts because of their race" without adequate justification, the Court held
that the plaintiffs did have a possible Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 657-58. The Court
remanded the case, leaving open the possibility that the state might offer a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest" to justify the redistricting plan. Id. at 658.
161. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
162. See id.
163. Id. at 113.
164. Id. at 115-16.
165. Id. at 118-20.
166. Id. at 120-21.
167. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 121.
168. Id. at 122. Gerrymandering is not the only method that political parties use to work
around the "one person, one vote" requirement of equally populated districts. See Peter S.
Canellos, Political Gamesmanship is a Losing Proposition, BOSTON GLOBE, January 4, 2005,
at A3. Canellos points Republican and Democrat tactics during the 2000 presidential election
including aiding military personnel in voting and less strict registration requirements for
individuals that relocate frequently, respectively. Id. Even the location of early voting booths
and the number of voting booths available (intended to increase or decrease the wait in line
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particular would ultimately prove to be key in the Vieth decision. 69 In de-
ciding whether political gerrymandering was a political question, the Court
stated that it was not "persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and
manageable standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be de-
cided.
170
The "one person, one vote" requirement of equally-populated districts
made mandatory by Reynolds was re-cast in light of "fair representation.'
' 71
Because districts with different populations and different numbers of repre-
sentatives resulted in different weights of individual votes, the issue boiled
down to representation.1 72 Likewise, racial gerrymandering cases concerned
representation because specific racial groups were being denied the oppor-
tunity to elect the officials of their choice. 173 In fact, one racial gerryman-
dering case acknowledged the existence of a "political fairness principle" in
relation to districting cases. 174 Connecting the dots from case to case, the
Court reasoned that the issue in Bandemer also concerned representation,
and the fact that it concerned a political group did not foreclose its justicia-
bility. 1 7
5
Though political gerrymandering claims were now officially declared
justiciable, whether such districting violated the Equal Protection Clause
was another matter. 176 The district court had applied a two-part test that
received approval from the Supreme Court. 177 The test required an intent to
discriminate against and a definite discriminatory effect on a specific politi-
cal subdivision. 178 Disposing of the first part of the test-intent-was a
fairly simple matter.' 79 The Court noted that not only is districting meant to
be a method of creating elections that are somewhat "politically fair," but
random districting without regard to political concerns could result in the
most unfair elections of all. 180 Because legislatures create districts with the
political effects of each line in mind, the result of that districting plan is
likely intentional, fulfilling the first part of the test. 
181
to vote) can be used to influence citizens' voting habits. Id.
169. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. 267.
170. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123.
171. Id. at 123-24.
172. Id. at 124.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 125.
175. Id.
176. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127.
177. Id. at 127.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 129.




In presenting the second part of the test-effects-the Bandemer plain-
tiffs did not show sufficient discrimination to support an Equal Protection
Clause violation.1 82 Initially, the Court made it clear that the Constitution
does not command results in the legislature that are proportionate to the
members of a political group in the general population. 83 In fact, the same
also applies to racial groups. 84 To raise a districting plan's resulting dis-
crimination to the level of Equal Protection Clause violation, the plan must
mean "excluded groups have less opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice." 185 Just because a party
fails to get its candidate elected does not mean that the party has been de-
nied the chance to impact politics.1 86 Instead, plaintiffs would need to show
a more general discriminatory effect over multiple elections. 187 The results
of one election alone would not be enough to prove a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause in a political gerrymandering claim.
1 88
Because there was insufficient evidence of adequate discriminatory ef-
fect under the Equal Protection Clause, the district court's decision that the
districting plan was unconstitutional was reversed. 189 This decision, how-
ever, was not unanimous as only four justices formed the plurality. 90 Not
only was the Court divided, but both Republicans and Democrats believed
that the decision was a "victory." 19' In fact, the case had created interesting
alliances between Republicans and Democrats prior to the final decision.
92
Still, Bandemer settled the issue of whether political gerrymandering
claims were justiciable and presented a two-part test of intent and effect for
use in deciding whether districting plans are unconstitutional.1 93 Lower
courts would wrestle with this test for the next eighteen years.' 94 The tally at
the end of nearly two decades would show that no relief was granted under
typical political gerrymandering claims. 195 One case was found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause, but it did not concern "the drawing of district
182. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129.
183. Id. at 130.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 131 (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982)).
186. Id. at 132-33 (noting that denial of chance to participate would include providing
fewer chances to register and vote and to participate in candidate nomination).
187. Id. at 132-35.
188. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 135.
189. Id. at 143.
190. Id. at 113 (White, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun J., joining).
191. Ruth Marcus, Gerrymandering May Be Illegal, Justices Rule, WASH. POST, July 1,
1986, at Al.
192. Id. In Bandemer, the Republican National Committee supported state Democrats in
an effort to break redistricting schemes in other states. Id.
193. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
194. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 279.
195. Id. at 279-80.
[Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
lines."'196 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged and addressed the struggle courts have faced in deciding political




Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia first noted that the underlying
issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer was whether the Supreme Court's decision re-
garding the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims in Davis v.
Bandemer was made in error, and if that question was answered in the nega-
tive, by what standard should political gerrymandering claims be judged.198
Initially, Justice Scalia traced the history of political gerrymandering in the
United States.' 99 This discussion lead to the standard set forth in Davis v.
Bandemer, including the key cases that prompted that decision and the fall-
out from that decision.200 After deciding that the standard proposed in Ban-
demer was, in fact, no standard at all, the discussion turned to suggested
alternate standards including: the standard proposed by the plaintiffs-
appellants, the standard suggested by Justice Powell's opinion in Bandemer
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), and the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions in Vieth.a°' In concluding that political gerrymandering claims
202would no longer be justiciable, Justice Scalia affirmed the district court.
1. The History of the Political Gerrymander
In a recap of political gerrymandering history, Justice Scalia pointed to
its presence in the American colonies in the early Eighteenth Century.20 3
The gerrymander was alive and well, and working its political magic even
before it earned its name as a result of Governor Elbridge Gerry's districting
scheme.20 4 Justice Scalia emphasized Congress's authority to restrain the
political gerrymander through Article I, Section Four, the Constitution's
"make or alter" clause.20 5 In addition, where "contiguity, compactness, and
equality of population" had once been required, Congress now only man-
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 272.
199. See id. at 274-77.
200. Veith IV, 541 U.S. at 277-84.
201. See id. at 284-305.
202. See id. at 305-06.
203. Id. at 274.
204. Id. at 274.
205. Id. at 275-76.
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dates the "single-member-district-requirement., 20 6 Despite Congress's con-
stitutional authority over districting, in 1986 the Supreme Court decided
Davis v. Bandemer, holding that the Equal Protection Clause gave the judi-
cial branch the same authority.
207
2. Political Questions and Davis v. Bandemer
Though Marbury v. Madison explicitly held that the courts are to inter-
pret the law, some questions were not meant for the courts because they
were either expressly given to another branch of government or because
there were no rights involved over which the courts have authority. 208 These
"political questions" were not within the judicial branch's reach, and in
1962, Baker v. Carr set out the test for those questions. 20 9 Of the six criteria
set out in that case, the second presented the problem for political gerry-
mander claims, the need for a standard courts could use in deciding gerry-
mander cases. 210 Because there was no majority agreement on the Bandemer
standard, and because the eighteen years since Bandemer was decided
brought many political gerrymandering cases with all but one refusing re-
lief, a close inspection of the so-called "standard" of Bandemer was in or-
der.2
1
3. The Test According to Bandemer
Bandemer proposed a two-part test that required "both intentional dis-
crimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discrimina-
tory effect on that group."2t 2 The first step of the test posed little problem
because of the ease in showing a legislature's intent when it created a redis-
tricting plan.21 3 The second part of the test proved to be the conundrum.21 4
206. Veith IV, 541 U.S. at 276.
207. Id. at 277.
208. Id. Justice Scalia emphasized that "Justice Marshall proclaimed two centuries ago,
'[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."'
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
209. Id. at 277.
210. Id, at 278-79.
211. Id. at 280-281. Justice Scalia related the ironic story of the one case (that went
unreported) in which judicial interference was granted: Republican Party of North Carolina
v. Hunt, No. 94-2410, 1996 WL 60439 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996). Id. at 287 n.8. In Hunt, the
district court intervened because it believed that the districting plans managed to successfully
block Republicans from effectively participating in the political process, and those plans
would continue to block Republican participation. Id. Less than one week after that decision,
in an election for superior court judges, all the Republican candidates won their desired seats.
Id. This resulted in the case being remanded. Id.




The requirement that there be a discriminatory effect necessitated more than
just disproportionate results in elections.215 A discriminatory effect meant
that a particular subset of the population "had been 'denied its chance to
effectively influence the political process' as a whole. 216 On a statewide
level, a political gerrymandering claim would only succeed if the plaintiffs
showed a lack of opportunity to directly or indirectly have an impact on
elections.2t 7
While concurring with the plurality in Bandemer, Justice O'Connor
expressed concern over the two-part test.2 18 Almost prophetically, Justice
O'Conner and Justice Powell, in separate opinions, conveyed apprehensions
that the judicial branch would not be able to utilize the test because the
standard was not clear enough. 219 Duly noting those opinions, Justice Scalia
then pointed to a long line of cases and commentary that struggled with the
standard outlined by Bandemer.220 Justice Scalia closed that section of the
opinion by stating that the Bandemer "standard was misguided when pro-
posed, has not been improved in subsequent application, and is not even
defended before us today by the appellants. 221
4. Alternate Tests
a. The Vieth plaintiffs-appellants' test
Justice Scalia addressed the standard proposed by the plaintiffs-
appellants in the Vieth case, due in part to the fact that it was so nearly rep-
resentative of other typical suggested standards.222 The plaintiffs-appellants'
test was based on the Bandemer requirements of intent and effect but with
requirements for demonstrating intent and effect.223
The intent part of the test was partially derived from cases that ad-
dressed racial gerrymandering and would require plaintiffs to demonstrate
that those creating the new districts had the "predominate intent" of gaining
the political upper-hand.224 According to Justice Scalia, this test would be
even more ambiguous than Bandemer.225 Justice Scalia disapproved of the
214. Id. at281.
215. Id. at 281.
216. Id. at 282 (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33).
217. Id.
218. Veith IV, 541 U.S. at 282.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 282-83.
221. Id. at 283-84.
222. Id. at 284.
223. Id.




comparison drawn between racial gerrymandering and political gerryman-
dering.226 Not only were racial gerrymandering cases determined on an in-
dividual district basis, while here the plaintiffs proposed a statewide test, but
also the Constitution prohibits race-based gerrymandering, while allowing
the possibility of political gerrymandering.227
Plaintiffs-appellants patched in pieces from the Voting Rights Act's
race discrimination tests to address the effects part of their test.228 This test
would require a showing of a redistricting plan based on "packing" and
"cracking," then an examination of the entirety of the circumstances to
demonstrate that the redistricting plan prevented plaintiffs from electing a
majority of the representatives even though they had the majority of the
votes. 229 Justice Scalia pointed out that while race is a permanent character-
istic, an individual's politics may vary, not to mention the fact that the Con-
stitution does not require proportionate representation.23° In addition, the
one person, one vote requirement cannot be used in obtaining proportionate
representation. 23' As it stands now, that requirement is based on an objec-
tive examination of the total numbers of voters and the numbers as divided
among districts.232 Translating the one person, one vote requirement, into a
proportionate-representation requirement would toss the judicial branch into
"a sea of imponderables. 233
b. Justice Powell
Justice Scalia then addressed Justice Powell's concurring in part, dis-
senting in part opinion in Bandemer.234 Though Justice Powell approved of
the intent and effect test of the plurality, he believed the main question was
whether the districts were created without any consideration for factors
other than politics. 235 The shape of the districts was the key factor, but es-
sentially all factors would converge on the general concepts of fairness and
vote dilution.236 Justice Scalia criticized this approach because it meant that
courts would have to examine and weigh multiple factors and then deter-
mine at what point a politically ambitious redistricting plan crossed the
226. See id. at 285-86.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 287.
229. Id. at 287-90.
230. Veith IV, 541 U.S. at 287-88.
231. Id. at 290.
232. Id. at 290.
233. Id. at 290.
234. Id. at 290-91.
235. Id.
236. Veith IV, 541 U.S. at 291.
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Constitutional line.237 In addition, the concept of fairness was not workable
for the courts.238 Potentially, a "fair" districting plan might not follow the
traditional considerations of compactness, contiguity, and respect for politi-
239
cal boundaries. Something more concrete than weighing a myriad of fac-
tors should be required in order for courts to get involved in partisan dis-
tricting disputes.240
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy agreed that the complaint in the Vieth case needed to
be dismissed, however, he did not agree that the types of claims presented in
Veith should be considered nonjusticiable if some solid test could be created
for those claims. 241 A "categorical negative" (that no standard could possi-
bly exist) is difficult to prove, and Justice Kennedy believed that the Court
gave in too quickly. 42 The fact that there had been no standard defined in
the eighteen years since Bandemer did not mean a firm test for political
gerrymandering cases could not be found.24 3
Justice Kennedy's standard would be the Fourteenth Amendment.2 "
As racial gerrymandering cases are grounded in the prohibition on classifi-
cation based on race, political gerrymandering claims must be grounded in
some method of classifying and districting voters that, though permissible,
violates voter rights.245 The First Amendment would also aid in deciding
political gerrymandering cases because such districting potentially infringes
on voter rights based on "ideology, beliefs, or political association.",
246
Although it appeared to Justice Kennedy that the Vieth case did present
a situation in which the legislature had gone too far in basing its redistrict-
ing plan on political ambitions, the case still required dismissal due to the
lack of a workable standard by which the plan could be judged.247 In re-
sponse to this, Justice Scalia pointed out that there were only two options
237. Id.
238. Id. at 291.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242. Veith IV, 541 U.S. at 311-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 313-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Daniel Ortiz described the link between the
Court's theory that extreme gerrymandering is unconstitutional and its inability to articulate a
standard as being similar to "firmly believing there is a God, but [] -knowing anything about
this God lies beyond human understanding." Daniel R. Ortiz, The Law of Democracy: Redis-
tricing: Case Law and Consequences: Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 496 (2004).
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for the Court in this case.248 Those options were either to apply an actual
standard to decide the case, or admit that there is no standard and declare
the issue nonjusticiable.249 Scalia felt that affirming the district court's deci-




According to Justice Stevens, the Court wrongly dismissed plaintiff-
appellant Furey's complaint because she lived in a district that was redis-
tricted in such a manner that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.251 The
standards set forth by Justice Powell in Bandemer to examine gerrymander-
ing on a district-level gave the Court its necessary "manageable stan-
dards., 252 Justice Stevens also agreed with the Bandemer Court's statement
that a political gerrymander is just as justiciable as a racial gerrymander. 253
Justice Stevens viewed the issue in light of First Amendment infringment. 4
Just as employment decisions could not be made on the basis of political
beliefs, neither could districting decisions.
255
Justice Scalia noted that both the plurality and Justice Stevens agree
that the court cannot manage statewide political gerrymandering claims. 256
Disagreement arises because of the analogy using racial gerrymandering
cases and because of the use of the First Amendment as a basis for deciding
political gerrymandering claims. 7 First, the Equal Protection Clause makes
race-based discrimination unacceptable, while there is no equivalent prohi-
bition for political discrimination. 8 Second, the right to free political
speech under the First Amendment does not translate to proportionate po-
251litical representation.
248. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 305.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. Id at 322-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 292.
257. Id. at 292-94.
258. Id. at 293.
259. Id. at 294.
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2. Justice Souter
Justice Souter also examined redistricting plans on an individual dis-
trict level.260 He also agreed with the plurality opinion that no manageable
standard existed at the time of the Vieth opinion.261 But instead of foreclos-
ing on the justiciability of political gerrymandering questions, Justice Souter
disposed of the standard as set forth in Bandemer and started all over with a
plan that combined concepts from multiple sources including the Voting
Rights Act, case law, and law journals.262 Justice Scalia believed that this
test would produce results similar to the Bandemer standard.2 63 The five-
step test would still present a fair amount of judicial line drawing, plenty of
gray area, and too many unanswered questions.2 64 Ultimately, because this
test would still require a decision on whether the legislature had gone too
far, Justice Scalia found the test just as unhelpful as Bandemer.265
3. Justice Breyer
Justice Scalia found Justice Breyer's dissent unworkable because not
only did Justice Breyer address political gerrymandering at a statewide
level, but he would base his decision on what constitutes "unjustified use of
political factors" and "effective government." 266 As with other suggested
standards, this standard would require judicial line-drawing on a scale be-
tween justified and unjustified political motivations.267 This is complicated
by the fact that the test is on a statewide level.268 Ultimately, Justice Scalia
could discern neither "what Justice Breyer [was] testing for, nor precisely
what fail[ed] the test., 269
D. Conclusion
In closing, Justice Scalia explained that the Court's decision to reverse
its direction from Bandemer and hold political gerrymandering claims un-
justiciable was not affected by stare decisis.270 The compelling force of
260. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 295.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 295.
263. See id. at 297.
264. Id. at 296-97.
265. Id. at 298.
266. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 298.
267. Id. at 299.
268. Id. at 300.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 305. "Stare decisis" means "to stand by things decided." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004). This stare decisis rule requires courts to rule based on the
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stare decisis was lessened for three main reasons.271 First, Congress could
not easily alter Court decisions concerning the Constitution.272 Second, no
firm test was ever laid out in Bandemer.273 Third, with no firm test, it would
be odd to suggest that anyone actually acted in reliance on Bandemer.274 In
almost two decades after the Supreme Court decided Bandemer, a practical
standard had remained an enigma.275
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Although Vieth initiated a change from eighteen years of the Bandemer
standard of judging political gerrymandering cases, it is difficult to say
whether Vieth brought clarity to an obscure area of American law, or
whether it simply created a whole new set of questions to confound courts
and would-be plaintiffs.276 Either way, there are certain limitations on redis-
tricting that remain intact, allowing courts to judge at least some aspects of
the redistricting process including the one-person, one-vote standard, indi-
vidual states' statutory limitations, and a prohibition on racial gerrymander-
ing.277 Certainly, questions remain concerning the level of involvement al-
lowed for political motivations in the redistricting process.
A. The Aftermath of Vieth v. Jubelirer
Justice Scalia's statement in Vieth that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not "provide[] a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations
that the States and Congress may take into account when districting" may
not be as clear or decisive as it initially sounds.278 As one commentator
noted, the ultimate effect of Veith is to commit "us to another generation of
principles set forth in prior decisions. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 140 (1990). Courts do have the
freedom to reject such principles, however, whenever they contradict other important values
or there has been a minimal amount of judicial reliance on those principles. Id.
271. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 305-06.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 305-06.
274. Id. at 306.
275. Id.
276. Vieth IV was a fractured decision with Justice Scalia writing the opinion for the
court joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas. Id. at 271.
Justice Kennedy wrote the concurring opinion. Id. at 306. Justice Stevens, Justice Souter
(joined by Justice Ginsburg), and Justice Breyer each filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 317,
343, 355. Because no five Justices agreed on one view, "the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest possible grounds." Vieth I, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
277. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 276, 290, 293 n.4.
278. See id. at 305.
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hacking our way through the political thicket., 279 When examining the var-
ied reactions to the case from commentators and courts, this statement may
ultimately prove to be true. There are those who believe that Justice Frank-
furter was "half right" when he warned courts not to enter into the political
thicket because those cases did not involve the rights of individual citi-
zens. 280 There are also those that believe Justice Frankfurter's warning was
absolutely correct, and Vieth is, in the end, "Frankfurter's revenge."22 '
Some read into Vieth that the Supreme Court believed unanimously
that political motivations can go too far when creating new districts and
violate the Constitution.282 Other commentators view Vieth as a blank
check, allowing all political gerrymandering to pass constitutional muster.
283
Despite all the controversy and differing opinions, the underlying theme is
the same as it has been since Bandemer: without a standard by which to
measure political gerrymander claims, no relief can be granted by the
courts.
2 84
These differing opinions are also seen in court reactions to Vieth. In
Johnson-Lee v. Minneapolis, the district court reasoned that while the Ban-
demer standard was no longer valid, cases involving political gerrymander-
ing remained justiciable. 285 Therefore, the court used Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion from Vieth to resolve the case.286 In Shapiro v. Berger,
on the other hand, the district court found that political gerrymandering
cases were not justiciable because there was no standard by which they
could be judged.287 Still, even Shapiro acknowledges that Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Vieth meant that political gerrymandering claims
might be justiciable if only someone would enunciate a workable stan-
dard.288
B. Standards that Remain After Vieth
Although political gerrymandering claims cannot come before the
court without a workable standard, politicians are not free to slice and dice
279. See Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 61, at 578.
280. Id.
281. See, Heather K. Gerken, The Law of Democracy: The Texas and Pennsylvania Par-
tisan Gerrymandering Cases: Last in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 512, 529 (2004).
282. Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REv. 781, 782 (2005).
283. Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1001 (2005).
284. See id. at 783.
285. 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19708, * 37 (D.C. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004).
286. Id. at * 39.




state districts as they please since certain limitations on the districting proc-
ess remain.289 Congress requires districts to be single-member only.290 Be-
sides this Congressional requirement, individual states are allowed to place
their own additional limitations on the districting process.
291
Another limitation on the districting process is a constitutional prohibi-
tion on racial gerrymandering.292 While there is room for a certain level of
racial considerations in creating districts, it must stop short of voter segrega-
tion based solely on race in order to avoid violating the Constitution.293 Ra-
cial discrimination requires strict scrutiny because it is prohibited by the
Constitution. 294 Discriminating against voters on the basis of politics does
not receive the same level of constitutional protection, which is why racial
gerrymandering standards do not translate well to political gerrymandering
claims. 295 Finally, there is the one-person, one-vote requirement.296 Politi-
cians are required to carve out districts that are as equally populated as pos-
sible.297 In judging districts based on this standard, courts require a higher
level of conformity in congressional districts than in districts created for
state elections.298
C. Where Does the Path Lead Now?
Even if Vieth did not completely clear the air on political gerrymander-
ing claims and the Fourteenth Amendment, it did send the very clear mes-
sage that the test according to Bandemer is not going to hold water in the
courts any longer.299 Until a manageable standard is introduced, there will
be no judicial intervention in political gerrymandering claims.3 °° Plaintiffs
wishing for court-ordered changes in a political-redistricting process will
have basically two alternatives. The first is to use other, more traditional
and definite standards such as the one-person, one-vote standard in seeking
relief or other statutory standards. 30 1 The second, and vastly more difficult
option, would be to create a standard that the courts can use in deciding
289. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 276.
290. Id.
291. Seeidatn.4.
292. HEBERT, supra note 51, at 50.
293. Vieth IV, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. HEBERT, supra note 51, at 1.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Berman, supra note 282, at 782.
300. Id. at 783.
301. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 276.
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political gerrymandering cases.30 2 Overall, it seems that this is the most im-
portant aspect of the Vieth decision: courts no longer have to struggle with
the Bandemer standard which has produced no real judicial intervention,
wasting time and resources for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts alike.303
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302. Berman, supra note 282, at 783.
303. See Vieth IV, 541 U.S. at 305-06. The results of the Vieth decision can be seen in
the Supreme Court's remand of the Texas redistricting cases such as Jackson v. Perry, 125 S.
Ct. 351 (2004). Vieth rendered Texas Democrats' claim against the Republican redistricting
plan "moot." R.G. Ratcliffe, Redistricting Appeal is Before Federal Panel Again, Hous.
CHRON., January 21, 2005. In explaining the driving force behind the plan, House Majority
Leader Tom Delay, proclaimed, "I'm the majority leader, and I want more seats." Adam
Cohen, GOP Power Grab is Part of a Trend, THE SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 29,
2003, at B7. On May 11, 2003, fifty-one Texas Democrats fled to a Holiday Inn in Ardmore,
Oklahoma, to prevent a quorum in the Texas House, thus frustrating Republican efforts to get
their redistricting plan passed. Mary Alice Robbins, Vacancy at the Texas House: Dems Bust
Quorum by Taking Field Trip to Oklahoma Holiday Inn, TEXAS LAWYER, May 19, 2003,
Vol. 19, No. 11, at 1. This prompted Texas Republicans to call them "Chicken D's." Id. The
Republicans also made "Wanted" posters, missing persons milk-cartons, and a card deck,
which was apparently a spoof on the Iraqi card deck. Joel Stein, Reported by Hilary Hylton,
Sure Beats Working, TIME MAG., at 42. The Democrats found some support for their actions,
even receiving a care package from Willie Nelson complete with bandanas, shirts, and whis-
key, encouraging them to "Stand your ground." Id. Even the Oklahoma house got in on the
action with "a resolution commending the courage of the Texas Democrats." Robbins, supra
note 297, at 1 . Texas Democrats also fired back with name-calling of their own, dubbing
DeLay "J. Edgar DeLay" because of his possible actions in involving the Department of
Homeland Security in the search for the absent Democrats. Marianne Means, Democrats Did
What They Had to Do, THE SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 29, 2003, at B7. They also
dubbed the plan "Tommymandering" in honor of the Majority Leader. Dave McNeely, Re-
districting Only Widens House Divide, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 22, 2003, at B 1.
Despite all the media attention, the United States Supreme Court refused to intervene and
remanded the case based on its decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 351.
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